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Abstract. In this article, we revisit the design strategy of PRESENT,
leveraging all the advances provided by the research community in con-
struction and cryptanalysis since its publication, to push the design up
to its limits. We obtain an improved version, named GIFT, that provides
a much increased efficiency in all domains (smaller and faster), while
correcting the well-known weakness of PRESENT with regards to linear
hulls.
GIFT is a very simple and clean design that outperforms even SIMON
or SKINNY for round-based implementations, making it one of the most
energy efficient ciphers as of today. It reaches a point where almost the
entire implementation area is taken by the storage and the Sboxes, where
any cheaper choice of Sbox would lead to a very weak proposal. In essence,
GIFT is composed of only Sbox and bit-wiring, but its natural bitslice data
flow ensures excellent performances in all scenarios, from area-optimised
hardware implementations to very fast software implementation on high-
end platforms.
We conducted a thorough analysis of our design with regards to state-
of-the-art cryptanalysis, and we provide strong bounds with regards to
differential/linear attacks.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, the development of ubiquitous computing applications trig-
gered the rapid expansion of the lightweight cryptography research field. All these
applications operating in very constrained devices may require certain symmetric-
key cryptography components to guarantee privacy and/or authentication for
the users, such as block or stream ciphers, hash functions or MACs. Existing
cryptography standards such as AES [20] or SHA-2 [35] are not always suitable for
these strong constraints. There have been extensive research conducted in this
direction, with countless new primitives being introduced [2,4, 5, 12,15,24,41],
many of them getting broken rather rapidly (designing a cipher with strong
constraints is not an easy task). Conforming to general trend, the American
National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) recently announced that it
will consider standardizing some lightweight functions in a few years [36]. Some
lightweight algorithms such as PRESENT [12], PHOTON [23] and SPONGENT [11] have
already been included into ISO standards (ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012 and ISO/IEC
29192-5:2016).
Comparing different lightweight primitives is a very complex task. First,
lightweight encryption encompasses a broad range of use cases, from passive
RFID tags (that require a very low power consumption to operate) to battery
powered devices (that require a very low energy consumption to maximise its
life span) or low-latency applications (for disk encryption). While it is generally
admitted that a major criterion for lightweight encryption is area minimisation,
the throughput/area ratio is also very important because it shows the ability
of the algorithm to provide good implementation trade-offs (this ratio is also
correlated to the power or energy consumption of the algorithm). Moreover, the
range of the various platforms to consider is very broad, starting from tiny RFID
tags to rather powerful ARM processors. Even high-end servers have to be taken
into account as it is likely that these very small and constrained devices will be
communicating with back-end servers [6].
While most ciphers take lightweight hardware implementations into account
to some extend, PRESENT [12] is probably one of the first candidates that was
exclusively designed for that purpose. Its design is inspired by SERPENT [7] and
is very simple: the round function is simply composed of a layer of small 4-bit
Sboxes, followed by a bit permutation layer (essentially free in hardware) and a
subkey addition. PRESENT has been extensively analysed in the past decade, and
while its security margin has eroded, it remains a secure cipher. One can note
that the weak point of PRESENT is the tendency of linear trails to cluster and to
create powerful linear hulls [10,17].
Since the publication of PRESENT, many advances have been obtained, both
in terms of security analysis and primitive design. The NSA proposed in 2013
two ciphers [4], SIMON and SPECK, that can reach much better efficiency in both
hardware and software when compared to all other ciphers. However, this comes
at the cost that proving simple linear/differential bounds for SIMON is much
more complicated than for Substitution-Permutation-Network (SPN) ciphers like
PRESENT (SIMON is based on a Feistel construction, with an internal function
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that uses only a AND, some XORs and some rotations). Besides, no preliminary
analysis or rationale was provided by the SIMON authors. Last year, the tweakable
block cipher SKINNY [5] was published to compete with SIMON’s efficiency for
round-based implementations, while providing strong linear/differential bounds.
As of today, SIMON and SKINNY seem to have a clear advantage in terms of
efficiency when compared to other designs. Yet, PRESENT remains an elegant
design, that suffers from being one of the first lightweight encryption algorithm to
have been published, and thus not benefiting from the many advances obtained
by the research community in the recent years.
Our contributions. In this article, we revisit the PRESENT construction, 10
years after the original publication of PRESENT. This led to the creation of GIFT,
a new lightweight block cipher, improving over PRESENT in both security and
efficiency. Interestingly, our cipher GIFT offers extremely good performances and
even surpasses both SKINNY and SIMON for round-based implementations (see
Table 1). This indicates that GIFT is probably the cipher the most suited for
the very important low-energy consumption use cases. Due to its simplicity and
natural bitslice organisation of the inner data flow, our cipher is very versatile
and performs also very well on software, reaching similar performances as SIMON,
the current fastest lightweight candidate on software.
Table 1. Hardware performances of round-based implementations of PRESENT,
SKINNY, SIMON and our new cipher GIFT, synthesized with STM 90nm Standard
cell library.
Area Delay Cycles TPMAX Power (µW) Energy
(GE) (ns) (MBit/s) (@10MHz) (pJ)
GIFT-64-128 1345 1.83 29 1249.0 74.8 216.9
SKINNY-64-128 1477 1.84 37 966.2 80.3 297.0
PRESENT 64/128 1560 1.63 33 1227.0 71.1 234.6
SIMON 64/128 1458 1.83 45 794.8 72.7 327.3
GIFT-128-128 1997 1.85 41 1729.7 116.6 478.1
SKINNY-128-128 2104 1.85 41 1729.7 132.5 543.3
SIMON 128/128 2064 1.87 69 1006.6 105.6 728.6
In more details, we have revisited the PRESENT design strategy and pushed it
to its limits, while providing special care to the known weak point of PRESENT:
the linear hulls. The diffusion layer of PRESENT being composed of only a bit
permutation, most of the security of PRESENT relies on its Sbox. This Sbox
presents excellent cryptographic properties, but is quite costly. Indeed, it is trivial
to see that the PRESENT Sbox needs to have a branching number of 3, or very
good differential paths would exist otherwise (with only a single active Sbox
per round). We managed to remove this constraint by carefully crafting the bit
permutation in conjunction with the Difference Distribution Table (DDT)/Linear
Approximation Table (LAT) of the Sbox. We remark that, to the best of the
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authors knowledge, this is the first time that the linear layer and the Sbox are
fully intricate in a SPN cipher.
In terms of performances, removing this Sbox constraint allowed us to choose
a much cheaper Sbox, which is actually what composes most of the overall
area cost in PRESENT. GIFT is not only much smaller, but also much faster than
PRESENT. As can be seen in Table 2, GIFT is by far the cipher that uses the least
total number of operation per bit up to now. In terms of security, we are able
to provide strong security bounds for simple differential and linear attacks. We
can even show that GIFT is very resistant against linear hulls, and the clustering
effect is greatly reduced when compared to PRESENT, thus correcting its main
weak point. We have conducted a thorough security analysis of our candidate
with state-of-the-art cryptanalysis techniques.
Table 2. Total number of operations and theoretical performance of GIFT and
various lightweight block ciphers. N denotes a NOR gate, A denotes a AND gate,
X denotes a XOR gate.
Cipher nb. of gate cost (per bit per round) nb. of op. nb. of op. round-based
rds int. cipher key sch. total w/o key sch. w/ key sch. impl. area
GIFT
28
1 N 1 N 3× 28 3× 28 1 + 2.67× 2
-64-128 2 X 2 X = 84 = 84 = 6.34
SKINNY
36
1 N 1 N 3.25× 36 3.875× 36 1 + 2.67× 2.875
-64-128 2.25 X 0.625 X 2.875 X = 117 = 139.5 = 8.68
SIMON
44
0.5 A 0.5 A 2× 44 3.5× 44 0.67 + 2.67× 3
-64/128 1.5 X 1.5 X 3.0 X = 88 = 154 = 8.68
PRESENT
31
1 A 0.125 A 1.125 A 4.75× 31 5.22× 31 1.5+ 2.67× 4.094
-128 3.75 X 0.344 X 4.094 X = 147.2 = 161.8 = 12.43
GIFT
40
1 N 1 N 3.0× 40 3.0× 40 1 + 2.67× 2
-128-128 2 X 2 X = 120 = 120 = 6.34
SKINNY
40
1 N 1 N 3.25× 40 3.25× 40 1 + 2.67× 2.25
-128-128 2.25 X 2.25 X = 130 = 130 = 7.01
SIMON
68
0.5 A 0.5 A 2× 68 3× 68 0.67 + 2.67× 2.5
-128/128 1.5 X 1 X 2.5 X = 136 = 204 = 7.34
AES
10
4.25 A 1.06 A 5.31 A 20.25× 10 24.81× 10 7.06+ 2.67× 19.5
-128 16 X 3.5 X 19.5 X = 202.5 = 248.1 = 59.12
We end up with a very natural and clean cipher, with a simple round function
and key schedule (composed of only a bit permutation, thus essentially free in
hardware). The cipher can be seen in three different representations (classical 1D,
bitslice 2D, and 3D), each offering simple yet different perspective on the cipher’s
security and opportunities for implementation improvements. GIFT comes in two
versions, both with a 128-bit key: one 64-bit block version GIFT-64 and one
128-bit block version GIFT-128. The only difference between these two versions
is the bit permutation to accommodate twice more state bits for GIFT-128.
In our hardware implementations of GIFT the storage composes about 75% of
the total area, and the (very cheap) Sbox about 20%. Since any weaker choice of
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the Sbox would lead to a very insecure design, we argue that GIFT is probably
very close to reaching the area limit of lightweight encryption.
Outline. We first specify GIFT in Section 2, and we provide the design rationale
in Section 3. A thorough security analysis is performed in Section 4, while
performances and implementation strategies are given in Section 5 and Section 6
for hardware and software respectively.
6
2 Specifications
In this work, we propose two versions of GIFT, GIFT-64-128 is a 28-round SPN
cipher and GIFT-128-128 is a 40-round SPN cipher, both versions have a key
length of 128-bit. For short, we call them GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 respectively.
GIFT can be perceived in three different representations. In this paper, we
adopt the classical 1D representation, describing the bits in a row like PRESENT.
It can also be described in bitslice 2D, a rectangular array like RECTANGLE [48]
(see Appendix A), and even in 3D cuboid like 3D [34] (see Appendix B).
Round function. Each round of GIFT consists of 3 steps: SubCells, PermBits,
and AddRoundKey, which is conceptually similar to wrapping a gift:
1. Put the content into a box (SubCells);
2. Wrap the ribbon around the box (PermBits);
3. Tie a knot to secure the content (AddRoundKey).
Figure 1 illustrates 2 rounds of GIFT-64.
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Fig. 1. 2 Rounds of GIFT-64.
Initialization. The cipher receives an n-bit plaintext bn−1bn−2...b0 as the cipher
state S, where n = 64, 128 and b0 being the least significant bit. The cipher
state can also be expressed as s many 4-bit nibbles S = ws−1||ws−2||...||w0,
where s = 16, 32. The cipher also receives a 128-bit key K = k7||k6||...||k0 as
the key state, where ki is a 16-bit word.
SubCells. Both versions of GIFT use the same invertible 4-bit Sbox, GS. The
Sbox is applied to every nibble of the cipher state.
wi ← GS(wi), ∀i ∈ {0, ..., s− 1}.
The action of this Sbox in hexadecimal notation is given in Table 3.
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Table 3. Specifications of GIFT Sbox GS.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
GS(x) 1 a 4 c 6 f 3 9 2 d b 7 5 0 8 e
PermBits. The bit permutation used in GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 are given in
Table 4 and 5 respectively. It maps bits from bit position i of the cipher state
to bit position P (i).
bP (i) ← bi, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}.
Table 4. Specifications of GIFT-64 Bit Permutation.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P64(i) 0 17 34 51 48 1 18 35 32 49 2 19 16 33 50 3
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P64(i) 4 21 38 55 52 5 22 39 36 53 6 23 20 37 54 7
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P64(i) 8 25 42 59 56 9 26 43 40 57 10 27 24 41 58 11
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P64(i) 12 29 46 63 60 13 30 47 44 61 14 31 28 45 62 15
AddRoundKey. This step consists of adding the round key and round con-
stants. An n/2-bit round key RK is extracted from the key state, it is further
partitioned into 2 s-bit words RK = U ||V = us−1...u0||vs−1...v0, where
s = 16, 32 for GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 respectively.
For GIFT-64, U and V are XORed to {b4i+1} and {b4i} of the cipher state
respectively.
b4i+1 ← b4i+1 ⊕ ui, b4i ← b4i ⊕ vi, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., 15}.
For GIFT-128, U and V are XORed to {b4i+2} and {b4i+1} of the cipher
state respectively.
b4i+2 ← b4i+2 ⊕ ui, b4i+1 ← b4i+1 ⊕ vi, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., 31}.
For both versions of GIFT, a single bit “1” and a 6-bit round constant
C = c5c4c3c2c1c0 are XORed into the cipher state at bit position n− 1, 23,
19, 15, 11, 7 and 3 respectively.
bn−1 ← bn−1 ⊕ 1,
b23 ← b23 ⊕ c5, b19 ← b19 ⊕ c4, b15 ← b15 ⊕ c3,
b11 ← b11 ⊕ c2, b7 ← b7 ⊕ c1, b3 ← b3 ⊕ c0.
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Table 5. Specifications of GIFT-128 Bit Permutation.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P128(i) 0 33 66 99 96 1 34 67 64 97 2 35 32 65 98 3
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P128(i) 4 37 70 103 100 5 38 71 68 101 6 39 36 69 102 7
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P128(i) 8 41 74 107 104 9 42 75 72 105 10 43 40 73 106 11
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P128(i) 12 45 78 111 108 13 46 79 76 109 14 47 44 77 110 15
i 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
P128(i) 16 49 82 115 112 17 50 83 80 113 18 51 48 81 114 19
i 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
P128(i) 20 53 86 119 116 21 54 87 84 117 22 55 52 85 118 23
i 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111
P128(i) 24 57 90 123 120 25 58 91 88 121 26 59 56 89 122 27
i 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
P128(i) 28 61 94 127 124 29 62 95 92 125 30 63 60 93 126 31
Key schedule and round constants. The key schedule and round constants
are the same for both versions of GIFT, the only difference is the round key
extraction. A round key is first extracted from the key state before the key state
update.
For GIFT-64, two 16-bit words of the key state are extracted as the round key
RK = U ||V .
U ← k1, V ← k0.
For GIFT-128, four 16-bit words of the key state are extracted as the round key
RK = U ||V .
U ← k5||k4, V ← k1||k0.
The key state is then updated as follows,
k7||k6||...||k1||k0 ← k1≫ 2||k0≫ 12||...||k3||k2,
where≫ i is an i bits right rotation within a 16-bit word.
The round constants are generated using the same 6-bit affine LFSR as
SKINNY, whose state is denoted as (c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0). Its update function is
defined as:
(c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0)← (c4, c3, c2, c1, c0, c5 ⊕ c4 ⊕ 1).
The six bits are initialized to zero, and updated before being used in a given
round. The values of the constants for each round are given in the table below,
encoded to byte values for each round, with c0 being the least significant bit.
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Rounds Constants
1 - 16 01,03,07,0F,1F,3E,3D,3B,37,2F,1E,3C,39,33,27,0E
17 - 32 1D,3A,35,2B,16,2C,18,30,21,02,05,0B,17,2E,1C,38
33 - 48 31,23,06,0D,1B,36,2D,1A,34,29,12,24,08,11,22,04
Remark: GIFT aims at single-key security, so we do not claim any related-key
security (even though no attack is known in this model as of today). In case one
wants to protect against related-key attacks as well, we advice to double the
number of rounds.
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3 Design Rationale
First, let us propose a subclassification for SPN ciphers.
Definition 1. Substitution-bitPermutation network (SbPN) is a subclassification
of Substitution-Permutation network, where the permutation layer (p-layer) only
comprises of bit permutation. An m/n-SbPN cipher is an n-bit cipher in which
substitution layer (s-layer) comprises of m-bit (Super-)Sboxes.
For SPN ciphers like AES and SKINNY, we can shift the XOR components
from the p-layer to the s-layer to form Super-Sboxes, leaving the p-layer with
only bit permutation. For example, PRESENT is a 4/64-SbPN cipher, SKINNY-64
is a 16/64-SbPN cipher, and SKINNY-128 and AES are 32/128-SbPN ciphers.
Having that said, GIFT-64 is a 4/64-SbPN cipher while GIFT-128 is (probably
the first of its kind) a 4/128-SbPN cipher.
3.1 The Designing of GIFT
Before we discuss the design rationale of GIFT, we would like to share some
background story about GIFT, its design approach, and its comparison with
another PRESENT-like ciphers.
The origin of GIFT. It all started with a casual remark “What if the Sboxes
in PRESENT are replaced with some smaller Sboxes, say the PICCOLO Sbox? It
will be extremely lightweight since the core cipher only has some Sboxes and
nothing else...”. We quickly tested it but only to realise that the differential
bounds became very low because the Sbox does not have differential branching
number of 3. That is when we started analyzing the differential characteristics
and studying the interaction between the linear layer and the Sbox. Surprisingly,
we found that by carefully crafting the linear layer based on the properties of the
Sbox, we were able to achieve the same differential bound as PRESENT without
the constraint of differential branching number of 3. In addition, this result can
also be applied to the improve linear cryptanalysis resistance which was lacking
in PRESENT. Eventually, a small present—GIFT was created.
Design approach. It is natural to ask how GIFT is different from the other
lightweight primitives, especially the recent SKINNY family of block ciphers that
was proposed at CRYPTO2016. One of the main differences is the design approach.
SKINNY was designed with a high-security-reduce-area approach, that is to have a
strong security property, then try to remove/reduce various components as much
as possible. While GIFT adopts a small-area-increase-security approach, starting
from a small area goal, we try to improve its security as much as possible.
Other PRESENT-like ciphers. Besides PRESENT, one may also compare GIFT-64
with RECTANGLE since both are 4/64-SbPN ciphers and an improvement on
the design of PRESENT. RECTANGLE was designed to be software friendly and
to achieve a better resistance against the linear cryptanalysis as compared to
PRESENT. However, although its bit permutation (ShiftRow) was designed to
be software friendly, little analysis was done on the how differential and linear
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characteristics propagate through the cipher. Whereas for GIFT, we study the
interplay of the Sbox and the bit permutation to achieve better differential and
linear bounds. In addition, the ShiftRow of RECTANGLE achieves full diffusion in 4
rounds at best. Whereas GIFT-64 achieves full diffusion in 3 rounds like PRESENT,
which can be proven to be the optimal for 4/64-SbPN ciphers.
3.2 Designing of GIFT Bit Permutation
To better understand the design rationale of the linear layer, we first look at the
permutation layer of PRESENT to analyze the issue when the Sbox is replaced
with another Sbox that does not have branching number of 3. Next, we show
how we can solve this issue by carefully designing the bit permutation.
Linear layer of PRESENT. The bit permutation of PRESENT is given in Table 6.
Table 6. Bit Permutation of PRESENT.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P (i) 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P (i) 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P (i) 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P (i) 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63
It is known that the bit permutation can be partitioned into 4 independent
bit permutations, mapping the output of 4 Sboxes to the input of 4 Sboxes in
the next round.
For convenience, we number the Sboxes in ith round as Sbi0, Sb
i
1, ..., Sb
i
s−1,
where s = n/4. These Sboxes can be grouped in 2 different ways - the Quotient
and Remainder groups, Qx and Rx, defined as
• Qx = {Sb4x, Sb4x+1, Sb4x+2, Sb4x+3},
• Rx = {Sbx, Sbq+x, Sb2q+x, Sb3q+x}, where q = s4 , 0 ≤ x ≤ q − 1.
In PRESENT, n = 64 and output bits of Qxi = {Sbi4x, Sbi4x+1, Sbi4x+2, Sbi4x+3}
map to input bits of Rxi+1 = {Sbi+1x , Sbi+14+x, Sbi+18+x, Sbi+112+x}, this group mapping
is defined in Table 7, where the entry (l,m) at row rw and column cl denotes
that the lth output bit of the Sbox corresponding to the row rw at ith round will
map to the mth input bit of the Sbox corresponding to the column cl at (i+ 1)th
round. For example, suppose x = 2, row and column start at 0, then the entry
(3, 2) at row 2 and column 3 means that the 3rd output bit of Sbi10 maps to 2
nd
input bit of Sbi+114 , thus P (43) = 58 (see Table 6).
PRESENT bit permutation can be realised in hardware with wires only (no
logic gates required). Further, full diffusion is achieved in 3 rounds; from 1 bit
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Table 7. PRESENT group mapping from Qxi to Rxi+1.
PPPPPPPQx
i
Rxi+1
Sbi+1x Sb
i+1
4+x Sb
i+1
8+x Sb
i+1
12+x
Sbi4x (0, 0) (1, 0) (2, 0) (3, 0)
Sbi4x+1 (0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1)
Sbi4x+2 (0, 2) (1, 2) (2, 2) (3, 2)
Sbi4x+3 (0, 3) (1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 3)
to 4, then 4 to 16 and then 16 to 64. But, if there exists Hamming weight 1 to
Hamming weight 1 differential transition, or 1− 1 bit differential transition, then
there exists consecutive single active bit transitions.
We define 1 − 1 bit DDT as a sub-table of the DDT containing Hamming
weight 1 differences. Consider some Sbox with the following 1− 1 bit DDT (see
Table 8). ∆x and ∆y denote the differential in the input and output of Sbox
respectively. It is evident that this Sbox has differential branch number 2.
Table 8. 1− 1 bit DDT Example 1
HHHHH∆x
∆y
1000 0100 0010 0001
1000 2 0 0 0
0100 0 0 0 0
0010 0 0 0 0
0001 0 0 0 0
Table 9. 1− 1 bit DDT Example 2
HHHHH∆x
∆y
1000 0100 0010 0001
1000 0 2 2 0
0100 0 0 0 0
0010 0 0 0 0
0001 0 2 2 0
It is trivial to see that there exists a single active bit path which results in a
differential characteristic with single active Sboxes in each round. Let the input
differences be at 3rd bit of Sb
(i)
15 . According to 1− 1 bit DDT (Table 8), there
exists a transition from 1000 to 1000. From the group mapping (Table 7), 3rd
output bit of Sb
(i)
15 maps to 3
rd input bit of Sb
(i+1)
15 . And then the differential
continues from 3rd output bit of Sb
(i+1)
15 to 3
rd input bit of Sb
(i+2)
15 and so on. Not
only that, if there exists any 1− 1 bit transition (not necessarily 1000→ 1000),
one can verify that there always exists some differential characteristic with single
active Sbox per round for at least 4 consecutive rounds.
To overcome this problem, we propose a new construction paradigm, “Bad
Output must go to Good Input” or BOGI in short. We explain this in the context
of the differential of an Sbox, but the analysis is same for linear case also.
Bad Output must go to Good Input (BOGI). The existence of the single
active bit path is because the bit permutation allows 1− 1 bit transition from
some Sbox in ith round to propagate to some Sbox in (i+ 1)th round that again
would produce 1−1 bit transition. To overcome such problem, it must be ensured
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that such path does not exist. In 1 − 1 bit DDT, let us define ∆x = x3x2x1x0
be a good input if the corresponding row has all zero entries, else a bad input.
Similarly, we define ∆y = y3y2y1y0 be a good output if the corresponding column
has all zero entries, else a bad output. In Table 8, 1000 is both bad input and
bad output, rest are good.
Consider another 1 − 1 bit DDT in Table 9. Let GI,GO,BI,BO denote
the set of good inputs, good outputs, bad inputs and bad outputs respectively.
Then, in Table 9, GI = {0100, 0010}, GO = {1000, 0001}, BI = {1000, 0001}
and BO = {0100, 0010}. Or, if we represent these binary strings by integers
considering the position of the “1” (rightmost position is 0) in these strings, we
may rewrite GI = {2, 1}, GO = {3, 0}, BI = {3, 0} and BO = {2, 1}.
An output belonging to BO (bad ouput) could potentially come from a single
bit transition through some Sbox in this round. Thus we want to map this active
output bit to some GI (good input) in the next round, which guaranteed that it
will not propagate to another 1− 1 bit transition. As a result, it avoids single
active bit path in 2 consecutive rounds.
BOGI: Let |BO| ≤ |GI| and pi1 : BO → GI be an injective map. To ensure
that pi1 is an injective map, it is required that |BO| ≤ |GI| (the cardinality of
the set BO must be less than or equal to the cardinality of the set GI). Let
pi2 : GO → pi1(BO)C (the complement of pi1(BO)) be another injective map.
The map pi1 ensures that “Bad Output must go to Good Input”. A combined
map pi : BO ∪GO → BI ∪GI is defined as pi(e) = pi1(e) if and only if e ∈ BO,
otherwise pi(e) = pi2(e). For example, consider the Table 9. The injective maps
pi1 : {2, 1} → {2, 1} and pi2 : {3, 0} → {3, 0} both have 2 choices which altogether
make 4 choices for the combined map pi. An example BOGI mapping would be
pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1, pi(2) = 2, pi(3) = 3, which happens to be an identity mapping.
Any choice of pi may be used to define the bit permutation. We call these pis
differential BOGI permutations as derived from 1− 1 bit DDT.
Remark: Similar analysis is done for linear case also. Analogous to 1 − 1 bit
DDT, analysis is done on the basis of 1 − 1 bit LAT and BOGI permutations
are found for linear case too. We call them linear BOGI permutations. We can
now choose any common permutation from the set of both differential and linear
BOGI permutations.
BOGI bit permutation for GIFT. Let pi : {0, 1, 2, 3} → {0, 1, 2, 3} be a com-
mon permutation from the set of both differential and linear BOGI permutations.
Table 10 shows the group mapping.
Note that we made some left rotations to the rows of the bit mapping, this is
because we need the inputs to each Sbox in (i+ 1)th round to be coming from 4
different bit positions.
In GIFT, we chose an Sbox that has a common BOGI permutation that is an
identity mapping, that is pi(i) = i. Figure 2 illustrates the group mapping from
Q0 to R0 in GIFT-64. The same BOGI permutation is applied to all the q group
mappings to form the final n-bit bit permutation for both version of GIFT.
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Table 10. BOGI Bit Permutation mapping from Qxi to Rxi+1.
PPPPPPPQx
i
Rxi+1
Sbi+1x Sb
i+1
q+x Sb
i+1
2q+x Sb
i+1
3q+x
Sbi4x (0, pi(0)) (1, pi(1)) (2, pi(2)) (3, pi(3))
Sbi4x+1 (1, pi(1)) (2, pi(2)) (3, pi(3)) (0, pi(0))
Sbi4x+2 (2, pi(2)) (3, pi(3)) (0, pi(0)) (1, pi(1))
Sbi4x+3 (3, pi(3)) (0, pi(0)) (1, pi(1)) (2, pi(2))
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
16
5
17
6
18
7
19
8
32
9
33
10
34
11
35
12
48
13
49
14
50
15
51
GSi3
GSi+112
GSi2
GSi+18
GSi1
GSi+14
GSi0
GSi+10
Fig. 2. Group mapping from Q0 to R0 in GIFT-64.
Some results about our bit permutation. Let Q0, Q1, · · · , Q(q − 1) be q
different Quotient groups and R0, R1, · · · , R(q − 1) be q different Remainder
groups. Then, for 0 ≤ x ≤ q − 1,
1. The input bits of an Sbox in Rx come from 4 distinct Sboxes in Qx.
2. The output bits of an Sbox in Qx go to 4 distinct Sboxes in Rx.
3. The input bits of 4 Sboxes from the same Qx come from 16 different Sboxes.
4. The output bits of 4 Sboxes from the same Rx go to 16 different Sboxes.
Lemma 1. When the number of Sboxes in a round is 16 or 32, the proposed
bit permutation achieves an optimal full diffusion which is achievable by a bit
permutation.
Proof. Considering 4 to 4 bits Sbox and a bit permutation in diffusion layer,
an input bit to an Sbox will influence 4 output bits which then again influence
inputs of 4 Sboxes in the next round influencing altogether 16 bits. By using
similar argument, after r rounds, a single bit will influence at most 4r number of
bits. For 4r ≥ 64, r must be greater than or equal to 3. And for 4r ≥ 128, r ≥ 4.
If the number of Sboxes in a round is 16, by using the proposed bit permutation,
the number of active Sboxes go from 1 to 16 in two rounds - by using arguments
(2) The output bits of an Sbox in Qx group go to 4 distinct Sboxes of the Rx
group and (4) The output bits of 4 Sboxes from the same Remainder group Rx
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go to 16 different Sboxes. Therefore, a single bit influences 16 Sboxes in two
rounds and thus 64 bits in three rounds which is optimal.
It could again be checked that if the number of Sboxes in a round is 32, the
proposed bit permutation needs four rounds to achieve the full diffusion, i.e., a
single bit influences 128 bits in 4 rounds which is optimal. uunionsq
Lemma 2. In the proposed bit permutation, there does not exist any single
active bit transition for two consecutive rounds in both differential and linear
characteristics.
Proof. We prove it by showing with differential only. However, the similar argu-
ment holds for linear also. Let the first transition has input ∆x(1) and output
∆y(1) where both ∆x(1) and ∆y(1) have hamming weight one. There can be two
cases -
1. ∆x(1) ∈ BI. Then ∆y(1) ∈ BO. Because of BOGI, BO → GI, and therefore,
∆x(2) ∈ GI. Thus, the hamming weight of ∆y(2) will be greater than or
equal to 2.
2. ∆x(1) ∈ GI. Then the hamming weight of ∆y(1) will be greater than or equal
to 2, contrary to our assumption. uunionsq
Definition 2. The differential (resp. linear) score of an Sbox is |GI|+|GO|
observed from 1− 1 bit DDT (resp. LAT).
Lemma 3. There exists differential (resp. linear) BOGI permutation for an Sbox
if and only if the differential (resp. linear) score of an Sbox is at least 4.
Proof. As per BOGI, pi1 : BO → GI. Since, pi1 is one-one, |BO| ≤ |GI|. Further-
more, |GO|+ |BO| = 4. Combining both, we get, |GO|+ |BO| = 4 ≤ |GO|+ |GI|.
Conversely, let |GO|+ |GI| ≥ 4. Since |GO|+ |BO| = 4, hence |GO|+ |GI| ≥
|GO|+ |BO| which then implies |GI| ≥ |BO|. uunionsq
It is essential that our Sbox has at least score 4 for both differential and linear,
and has some common BOGI permutation. These are 2 of the main criteria for
the selection of GIFT Sbox.
Remark: BOGI permutation is a group mapping that is independent of the
number of groups. Thus, this permutation design is scalable to any bit permutation
size that is multiple of 16. This allows us to potentially design larger state size
like 256-bit that is useful for designing hash functions.
3.3 Selection of GIFT Sbox
We first recall some Sbox properties and introduce a metric to estimate the
hardware implementation cost of Sboxes.
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Properties of Sbox. Let S : F42 → F42 denote a 4-bit Sbox. For the differential
property, let ∆I , ∆O ∈ F42 be the input and output differences, we define
DS(∆I , ∆O) = ]{x ∈ F42|S(x)⊕ S(x⊕∆I) = ∆O},
and the maximum all nonzero transitions as
Dmax(S) = max
∆I ,∆O 6=0
DS(∆I , ∆O).
For the linear property, let α, β ∈ F42 be the input and output masking, we
define
LS(α, β) = |]{x ∈ F42|x • α = S(x) • β} − 8|,
and the maximum over all nonzero masking as
Lmax(S) = max
α,β 6=0
LS(α, β).
Definition 3 ( [38]). Let Mi and Mo be two invertible matrices and ci, co ∈ F42.
The Sbox S′ defined by S′(x) = MoS(Mi(x ⊕ ci)) ⊕ co belongs to the affine
equivalence (AE) set of S.
It is known that both Dmax and Lmax are preserved under the AE class.
Definition 4 ( [38]). Let Pi and Po be two bit permutation matrices and ci, co ∈
F42. The Sbox S′ defined by S′(x) = PoS(Pi(x⊕ci))⊕co belongs to the permutation-
xor equivalence (PE) set of S.
One is to note that the 1− 1 bit differential and linear transition is preserved
only under the PE class. That is to say that the score of an Sbox is preserved
under the PE class but not the AE class.
Heuristic Sbox implementation. We use a simplified metric to estimate the
implementation cost of Sboxes. We denote {NOT, NAND, NOR} as N-operations1 and
{XOR, XNOR} as X-operations, and estimate the cost of an N-operation to be 1 unit
and X-operations to be 2 units. We consider the following 4 types of instruction
for the construction of the Sboxes: a← NOT(a); a← a X b; a← a X (b N c); a←
a X ((b N c) N d), where a, b, c, d are distinct bits of an Sbox input. These so-called
invertible instructions [25] allow us to implement the inverse Sbox by simply
reversing the sequence of the instructions. In addition, the implementation cost
of the inverse Sbox would be the same as the direct Sbox since the same set of
instructions is used.
Under this metric, we found that PRESENT Sbox requires 4N + 9X operations,
a cost of 22 units. While RECTANGLE Sbox requires 4N + 7X operations, a cost of
18 units. Hence, one of the criteria for our Sbox is to have implementation cost
lesser than 18 units2.
1We do not need to consider AND and OR because when we use these invertible
instructions, it is equivalent to some other instructions that have been taken into
consideration. For instance, a XOR (b AND c) ≡ a XNOR (b NAND c).
2This “unit” metric is to facilitate the Sbox search, the Sboxes are later synthesized
to obtain their GE in Section 5.
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Search for GIFT Sbox. Our primary design criteria for the GIFT Sbox are:
1. Implementation cost of at most 17 units.
2. With a score of at least 4 in both differential and linear. I.e. For both
differential and linear, |GO|+ |GI| ≥ 4.
3. There exists a common BOGI permutation for both differential and linear.
From the list of 302 AE Sboxes presented in [14], we generate the PE Sboxes
and check its implementation cost. Our heuristic search shows that there is no
optimal Sboxes [31] (Dmax = 4 and Lmax = 4) that satisfies all 3 criteria, hence
we extended our search to non-optimal Sboxes. For Sboxes with Dmax = 6 and
Lmax = 4, we found some Sboxes with implementation cost of 16 units. For a cost
of 15 units, the best possible Sboxes (in terms of Dmax and Lmax) that satisfies
the criteria have Dmax = 12 and Lmax = 6. And Sboxes with cost of at most 14
units have either Dmax = 16 or Lmax = 8. To maximise the resistance against
differential and linear attacks while satisfying the Sbox criteria, we consider
Sboxes with Dmax = 6, Lmax = 4 and implementation cost of 16 units.
In order to reduce the occurrence of sub-optimal differential transition, we
impose two additional criteria:
4. ]{(∆I , ∆O) ∈ F42 × F42|DS(∆I , ∆O) > 4} ≤ 2.
5. For DS(∆I , ∆O) > 4, wt(∆I) + wt(∆O) ≥ 4, where wt(·) is the Hamming
weight.
Criteria (5) ensures that when sub-optimal differential transition occurs, there
is a total of at least 4 active Sboxes in the previous and next round.
Finally, we pick an Sbox with a common BOGI permutation for differential
and linear that is an identity, i.e. pi(i) = i.
Properties of GIFT Sbox. Our GIFT Sbox GS can be implemented with 4N+6X
operations (smaller than the Sboxes in PRESENT and RECTANGLE), has a maximum
differential probability of 2−1.415 and linear bias of 2−2, algebraic degree 3 and no
fixed point. For the sub-optimal differential transitions with probability 2−1.415,
there are only 2 such transitions and the sum of Hamming weight of input
and output differentials is 4. The implementation, differential distribution table
(DDT) and linear approximation table (LAT) of GS are provided in Appendix C.
3.4 Designing of GIFT Key Schedule
Key state update. One of our main goals when designing the key schedule is
to minimize the hardware area, and thus we chose bit permutation which is just
wire shuﬄe and has no hardware area at all. For it to be also software friendly, we
consider the entire key state rotation to be in blocks of 16-bit, and bit rotations
within some 16-bit blocks. Since it is redundant to apply bit rotations within key
state blocks that have not been introduced to the cipher state, we update the
key state blocks only after it has been extracted as a round key.
To introduce the entire key material into the cipher state as fast as possible,
the key state blocks that are extracted as the round key are chosen such that all
the key material are introduced into the cipher state in the least possible number
of rounds.
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Adding round keys. To optimize the hardware performances of GIFT, we XOR
the round key to only half of the cipher state. This saves a significant amount of
hardware area in a round-based implementation. For it to be software friendly
too, we XOR the round key at the same i-th bit positions of each nibble. This
makes the bitslice implementation more efficient. In addition, since all nibbles
contains some key material, the entire state will be dependent on the key after a
SubCells operation.
The choice of the positions for adding the round key and 16-bit rotations
were chosen to optimize the related-key differential bounds. However, we would
like to reiterate that more rounds is advised to resist related-key attacks.
Round constants. For the round constants, but instead of using a typical
decimal counter, we use a 6-bit affine LFSR (like in SKINNY [5]). It requires only
a single XNOR gate per update which is probably has smallest possible hardware
area for a counter. Each of the 6 bits is xored to a different nibble to break the
symmetry. In addition, we add a “1” at the MSB to further increase the effect.
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4 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide the various cryptanalysis that we had conducted on
GIFT.
4.1 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis [9] (DC) and linear cryptanalysis [32] (LC) are among
the most powerful techniques available for block ciphers. Analyzing the resistance
of a cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis of a block cipher is perhaps
the most common and fundamental security analysis. One of the ways to gauge
the resistance of a cipher is to find the lower bound for the number of active
Sboxes involved in a differential or linear characteristic.
In our work, we use Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to compute
the lower bounds for the number of active Sboxes in both DC and LC for various
numbers of rounds, the results are summaries in Table 11. The MILP solution
provides us the actual differential or linear characteristics, which allows us to
compute the actual differential probability and correlation contribution from the
DDT (Table 18) and LAT (Table 19) of GS.
Table 11. Lower bounds for number of active Sboxes.
Cipher DC/LC
Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GIFT-64
DC 1 2 3 5 7 10 13 16 18
LC 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 18
PRESENT
DC 1 2 4 6 10 12 14 16 18
LC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RECTANGLE
DC 1 2 3 4 6 8 11 13 14
LC 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 14
GIFT-128
DC 1 2 3 5 7 10 13 17 19
LC 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 14 18
Recall that one of our main goals is to match the differential bounds of
PRESENT, that is having an average of 2 active Sboxes per round, but with a
lighter Sbox and without the constraint of differential branching number of
3. In addition, we aim for the same ratio for the linear bound which was not
accomplished by PRESENT. These targets were achieved at 9-round of GIFT. Hence,
our DC and LC analysis and discussion focus on 9-round.
Differential cryptanalysis. Generally, for an adversary to mount at DC on
an n-bit block cipher using DC, there must be some differential propagation with
differential probability larger than 21−n. An r-round differential is the compiling
effect of multiple r-round differential characteristics under the same input and
output differences. Thus the differential probability can be computed by simply
taking the summation of the probabilities of all the differential characteristics
under the same input and output differences.
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To compute a 9-round differential probability of GIFT, we first find a differential
characteristic with the least number of active Sboxes. Next, by fixing the input
and output differences, we repeatedly search for the next best possible differential
characteristic and we sum up the probabilities. The search terminates when the
subsequent differential characteristic has insignificant contribution in improving
the differential probability further.
For GIFT-64, it has a 9-round differential probability of 2−44.415, taking
the average per round and propagate forward, we expect that the differential
probability will be lower than 2−63 when we have 14-round3. Therefore, we believe
28-round GIFT-64 is enough to resist against DC.
Using the same methodology, we found that PRESENT with 9-round differential
probability of 2−40.702 is expected to require 14-round. While RECTANGLE with
9-round differential probability of 2−38.704 is expected to require 15-round. It is
to note that our estimation matches the belief of the RECTANGLE designers that
it is impossible to construct an efficient 15-round differential distinguisher for
RECTANGLE [48].
For GIFT-128, it has a 9-round differential probability of 2−46.99, which
suggested that 26-round is sufficient to achieve a differential probability lower
than 2−127. Therefore, we believe 40-round GIFT-128 is enough to resist against
DC.
For both of the GIFT version, it is interesting to note that in most of the
cases, an optimal differential characteristic is the only one with the least number
of active Sboxes, subsequent differential characteristics under the same input
and output differences have significantly more active Sboxes than the initial
characteristic. Thus the differential probability is close to the probability of the
optimal differential characteristic. Unlike PRESENT, which due to its symmetry
structure, tend to have several optimal differential characteristics for some fixed
input and output differences.
Linear cryptanalysis. Given a linear characteristic with a bias , the square
of the correlation contribution (so-called correlation potential [19]) is defined as
42. For an adversary to mount LC on an n-bit block cipher, she would require
the correlation potential to be larger than 2−n. To compute the r-round linear
hull effect, which is the compile effect of multiple r-round linear characteristics
under the same input and output masking, we use the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ( [48]). The average correlation potential (linear hull effect) between
an input and an output selection pattern is the sum of the correlation potentials
of all linear trails between the input and output selection patterns.
Similar to differential, we first find an optimal linear characteristic, fix the
input and output masking to find subsequent best possible linear characteristics
3Mathematically, we need 13-round to achieve a differential probability lower than
2−63. However, since there is no whitening key at the beginning, the differential proba-
bility actually starts from the second round. Hence we added an additional round to
the estimation.
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and take the summation of the correlation potentials. The search is terminated
when subsequent linear characteristic has insignificant contribution to the linear
hull effect.
For GIFT-64, it has a 9-round linear hull effect of 2−49.997, which expected to
require 13-round4 to achieve correlation potential lower than 2−64. Therefore, we
believe 28-round GIFT-64 is enough to resist against LC.
Using the same methodology, we found that PRESENT with 9-round linear hull
effect of 2−27.186 is expected to require 22-round. While RECTANGLE with 9-round
linear hull effect of 2−36.573 is expected to require 16-round.
For GIFT-128, it has a 9-round linear hull effect of 2−45.99, which means that
we would need around 27 rounds to achieve correlation potential lower than
2−128. Therefore, we believe 40-round GIFT-128 is enough to resist against LC.
Related-key differential cryptanalysis. For GIFT-64, since it takes 4 rounds
for all the key material to be introduced into the cipher state, it is trivial to see
that it is possible to have no active Sboxes from 1-round to 4-round. Thus we start
our computation on the related-key differential bounds from 5-round onwards.
From 5-round to 12-round, the probability of these differential characteristics are
2−1.415, 2−5, 2−6.415, 2−10, 2−16, 2−22, 2−27, 2−33 respectively. Even if we suppose
that the probability of 12-round characteristic is lower bounded by 2−33, it is
doubtful that 28 rounds are secure against related-key differential cryptanalysis.
Therefore, as we mentioned in Section 2, we strongly recommend to increase the
number of rounds to achieve the security against the related-key attacks.
For GIFT-128, we start our computation from 3-round onwards. From 3-
round to 9-round, the probabilities are 2−1.415, 2−5, 2−7, 2−11, 2−20, 2−25, 2−31
respectively. Similar to GIFT-64, it is doubtful that 40 rounds are secure against
related-key differential cryptanalysis.
4.2 Details of Integral Attacks
This section shows the security against integral attacks.
Integral Distinguishers Using Division Property. We first search for inte-
gral distinguishers by using the (bit-based) division property, [42, 44] because
the division property can find the longest integral distinguisher on similar block
cipher PRESENT [45, 47].
We first evaluate the propagation of the division property for GIFT Sbox. The
algebraic normal form of GIFT Sbox is described as
y0 = 1 + x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x3,
y1 = x0 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x3,
y2 = x1 + x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x1x2x3,
y3 = x0 + x1x3 + x0x2x3,
and the propagation of the division property is summarized as Table 12.
4Similar to the differential, added an additional round to the estimation.
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Table 12. The possible propagation of the division property for GIFT Sbox.
@
@u
v
0x0 0x1 0x2 0x4 0x8 0x3 0x5 0x9 0x6 0xA 0xC 0x7 0xB 0xD 0xE 0xF
0x0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x9 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x6 x x x x x x x x x x x x
0xA x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0xC x x x x x x x x x x x x x
0x7 x x x x x x
0xB x x x x x x
0xD x x x x x x x x x x x
0xE x x x x x x x x x x x
0xF x
Here, let u and v be the input and output division property, respectively.
The propagation from u to v labeled x is possible. Otherwise, the propagation is
impossible.
Taking into account the bit-permutation of GIFT, we evaluated the propagation
of the division property on reduced-round GIFT. To search for the longest integral
distinguisher, we choose only one bit in plaintext as constant, and the others are
active. Then, the number of rounds that we can find integral distinguishers is 9
rounds for GIFT-64, and the following is an example.
(A60, ACAA)
9R−−→ ((UUBB)16)
Here, only 2nd bit in plaintext is constant, and (4× i)th and (4× i+ 1)th bits
in 9-round ciphertexts are balanced. Note that the round key is not XORed
with plaintext in the first round. Therefore, we can trivially extend integral
distinguishers by one round, and GIFT-64 has 10-round integral distinguishers,
respectively.
14-Round Attack on GIFT-64-128. We append four rounds to the 10-round
integral distinguisher as the key recovery and attack 14-round GIFT-64-128.
Let sri,j be the input of the (r + 1)th round function. Then, s
10
i,0 and s
10
i,1 are
balanced for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 16}. Moreover, the attack is executed by using the
partial-sum technique [21].
We first evaluate whether or not s100,0 and s
10
0,1 are balanced from ciphertexts.
To evaluate the balancedness, we need to evaluate the value of
(s1215,3, . . . , s
12
12,3, s
12
11,2, . . . , s
12
8,2, s
12
7,1, . . . , s
12
4,1, s
12
3,0, . . . , s
12
0,0)
Please see Fig 3. The value (s123,0, . . . , s
12
0,0), which is labeled in red color, are
computed from 16 bits in ciphertexts by guessing 16 bits in (RK12, RK13).
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RK10
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RK11
GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS
RK12
GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS
RK13
BB
Fig. 3. 4-round key recovery.
Therefore, guess 216 round keys involved to red lines for 263 ciphertexts, reduce
the memory size from 263 to 252, and the time complexity is 216+63 = 279. Next,
additionally guess 216 round keys involved to blue lines for 252 memory, reduce
the memory size from 252 to 240, and the time complexity is 216×2+52 = 284.
Similarly, additionally guess 216 round keys involved to green lines for 240 memory,
reduce the memory size from 240 to 228, and the time complexity is 216×3+40=88.
Additionally guess 216 round keys involved to yellow lines for 228 memory, reduce
the memory size from 228 to 216, and the time complexity is 216×4+28=92. Finally,
additionally guess 210 round keys in (RK10, RK11) and evaluate whether or
not s100,0 and s
10
0,1 are balanced. The time complexity is 2
16×4+10+16 = 290. In
total, the time complexity in the partial-sum technique is about 292. We repeat
this procedure 16 times as changing the bit position where we evaluate the
balancedness, and the total time complexity is 296. As a result, the number
of candidates of the secret key is reduced to 2128−32=96, and we exhaustively
guess these keys. Therefore, the total time complexity is about 297 and the data
complexity is 263.
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Remarks on GIFT-128-128. We also evaluated the longest integral distinguisher
for GIFT-128-128 by using the (bit-based) division property. As a result, we
can find 11-round integral distinguisher. The number of rounds is improved by
two rounds than that for GIFT-64-128. However, the number of bits in round
key that is XORed every round increases from 32 bits to 64 bits. Therefore, we
expect that GIFT-128-128 is also secure against integral attacks.
4.3 Impossible Differential Attacks
Impossible differential cryptanalysis [8,27] exploits a pair of difference ∆1 and ∆2
in which the state difference ∆1 never reaches the state difference ∆2 after some
particular rounds. Such ∆1, ∆2 are called impossible differentials. In general,
several rounds are added before and after the impossible differentials. Given two
pairs of plaintext and ciphertext with difference ∆P,∆C, the attacker guesses
subkey values for the appended rounds, and apply the partial encryption/decryp-
tion to the impossible differentials. Subkeys leading to impossible differentials
are detected to be wrong.
Given that the GIFT-64-128 achieves full diffusion only after 3 rounds, there
does not exist any 6-round truncated impossible differentials. We then imple-
mented impossible differential search tool based on MILP [18,40], to take into
account the differential distribution through the Sbox. We exhaustively tested
input and output differences satisfying the following conditions.
• The input difference activates only one of the first four Sboxes.
• The output difference activates only one Sbox.
For the first condition, there are 4 × 15 = 60 such input differences. For the
second condition, there are 16 × 15 = 240 such output differences. Hence, we
tested 60× 240 = 14, 400 pairs of input and output differences.
The search results show that 11,904 choices out of 14,400 choices are actually
impossible. Hence, with a high probability, a pair of input and output differences
with 1 active nibble is impossible after 6 rounds. We further extend this search
procedure to 7 rounds, and obtained that there does not exist any impossible
differential from the 14,400 pairs for 7 rounds.
The number of rounds of impossible differentials is much smaller than the
integral attack, thus we omit the detailed analysis of the key recovery part. Full
rounds are quite sufficient to resist the impossible differential attack against
GIFT.
4.4 Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks
This section shows the security against meet-in-the-middle attacks. The meet-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack discussed here is a rather classical one, which
separates the encryption algorithm into two independent functions [13, 16]. After
the discovery of several techniques against hash functions such as splice-and-
cut [1] or initial-structure [39] techniques, MITM attacks can be applied to ciphers
with some complex structures. Here, we explain a key recovery attack against
15-round GIFT-64-128 by using the MITM attack.
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Chunk Separation. We first observe that GIFT-64-128, in every round, XORs
32 bits out of 128 bits of the master key to the state. In round i mod 1, subkey
bits are derived from (k0, k1). Although bit positions are rotated for different i,
bits from other subkeys are never used in round i mod 1. Similarly, subkey bits
in round i mod 2, i mod 3, and i mod 4 are derived from (k2, k3), (k4, k5) and
(k6, k7), respectively.
Given this property, 6-round attack can be mounted easily. Namely the first
three rounds (rounds 1 to 3) are independent from 64 key bits of k6, k7 and
the subsequent three rounds (rounds 4 to 6) are independent from 64 key bits
of k4, k5. Hence, for each guess of k0, k1, k2, k3 the two parts can be computed
independently.
We then extend the number of attacked rounds by using several techniques.
As a result of our analysis, we choose that 8 bits of (k6, k7) and 8 bits of k2, k3
as sources of independent computations. Those bits are called neutral its. We
then separate 15 rounds as shown in Fig. 4. Hereafter, we use the notation kF6
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Subkey U k1 k
B
3 k5 k
F
7 k1 k
B
3 k5 k
F
7 k1 k
B
3 k5 k
F
7 k1 k
B
3 k5
V k0 k
B
2 k4 k
F
6 k0 k
B
2 k4 k
F
6 k0 k
B
2 k4 k
F
6 k0 k
B
2 k4
Remarks ←− IS −→ PM ←−
Fig. 4. Chunk separation for 15-round MitM attack
and kF7 to stress that neutral bits in the forward direction is included in k6 and
k7. Similarly, we use the notations k
B
2 , k
B
3 .
As shown Fig. 4, the forward computation starts from round 4 while the
backward computation starts from round 6. The initial structure (IS) allows us
to process those three rounds independently by carefully choosing the position of
neutral bits so that the propagation cannot overlap.
From round 7 to round 9, k2 and k3 never appear, thus independent computa-
tion can be performed easily. Similarly from round 3 to round 1, k6 and k7 never
appear, thus by fixing the internal state during IS, backward computation can be
done up to plaintext independently of the value of k6 and k7. Then the attacker
uses the splice-and-cut technique, i.e. to make an adoptive chosen plaintext query
to obtain the corresponding ciphertext. Then the independent computation can
continue until the input of round 13. Finally, we process the partial computation
for the middle 3 rounds (round 10 to round 12) and partially match (PM) the
results from two directions to efficiently filter unmatched candidates of k2, k3
and k6, k7.
Initial Structure. We explain that the impact of neutral bits of k6, k7 from
round 4 to round 6 and the impact of neutral bits of k2, k3 from round 6 to
round 4 never interact each other, hence the forward computation and backward
computation can start from round 4 and from round 6, respectively. The analysis
is illustrated in Fig. 5. We first introduce notations SIi , S
SC
i and S
PB
i to denote
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Fig. 5. 3-round initial structure for 15-round MITM attack.
the initial state, the state after SubCells, and the state after PermBits in round
i, respectively. In Fig. 5, 64-bit states are denoted in 2-dimensional array which
will be detailed in Appendix A. In short, each 4× 16 represents 1 bit. The cell
in row i and column j where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 15} corresponds to bit
position 4j + i. Thus, S-box is applied to each column.
We choose 4 bits of k6 in bit positions 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 bits of k7 in bit position
0, 1, 2, 3 in round 4 as neutral bits in the forward computation. We also choose 4
bits of k2 in bit positions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 4 bits of k3 in bit position 8, 9, 10, 11 in
round 6 as neutral bits in the backward computation. Those bits are XORed to
the state by AddRoundKey in round 4 and round 6.
Suppose that 112 subkey bits not chosen as neutral bits are fixed. We then
fix the 48 state bits in SPB4 in bit positions 0 to 47, which are not affected by the
backward computation. Because the value of bit positions 0, 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 of
state SPB4 are fixed (gray in Fig. 5), for any 2
8 choices of neutral bits in kF6 , k
F
7 ,
we can compute the corresponding value of SI5 . After the SubCells, the first
16 bits of the state will get affected, and those will be eventually moved to bit
positions 0, 4, 8, 12, 17, 21, 25, 29, 34, 38, 42, 46, 51, 55, 59, 63 of SPB6 .
The fixed 96 bits in SPB4 fix 64 bits of the state from S
I
5 to S
I
7 . We also fix 32
bits of SPB6 in bit positions 3, 7, 11, 15, 16, 20, 24, 28, 33, 37, 41, 45, 50, 54, 58, 62.
This allows to compute bit positions kB2 , k
B
3 . Those 8 bits eventually affect bit
positions 48 to 63 of SI5 . In the end, computations in those three rounds never
overlap, which indicates that they can be independently computed.
Partial Matching. After the IS, the forward computation can continue up to
round 9 and SubCells and PermBits operations in round 10 until kB2 , k
B
3 appear.
The results of 28 choices of neutral bits of kF6 , k
F
7 are stored in a list LF with 2
8
entries. Similarly, the backward computation can be processed until the beginning
of round 13 via chosen plaintext query. We then search for the matched pair over
the three rounds (rounds 10 to 12) in the middle. The analysis is illustrated in
Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. 3-round partial matching for 15-round MITM attack.
kB2 and k
B
3 in round 10 are rotated from the values in round 6. k
B
2 is rotated
by 12 bits to right and kB3 is rotated by 2 bits to right, which moves the neutral
bit positions as shown in Fig. 6. Regarding kF6 and k
F
7 in round 12, those are
updated by rotation twice compared to the values in round 4. Hence, those are
rotated by 24 bits and 4 bits to right respectively.
Partial computations are rather straightforward. In forward direction, 8
unknown bits of subkeys in round 10 hide 24 bits of SI12, but the attacker can
still compute the 40 bits of SI12. Similarly the attacker can compute the 48 bits
of SI12 in the backward direction. Those overlap in 40 bits, thus can match 40-bit
value at SI12.
Complexity Analysis. For each of 2112 values of subkeys not chosen as neutral
bits, the attacker compute the forward chunk and backward chunks for 28
choices of neutral bits. After the 32-bit match, 28 · 28 · 2−40 = 2−24 candidates
will remain. After 2112 iterations, 2112 · 2−24 = 288 key candidates will be
obtained, which is verified with exhaustive search. Therefore, the time complexity
is 2112 · 28 + 288 ≈ 2120 and the memory complexity is 28. During the backward
computation, we make adaptive chosen-plaintext queries. Thus the number of
queries is 2112 · 28 = 2120 which requires the knowledge of the full codebook.
Thus the data complexity is 264. During the attack, the attacker can refer to this
codebook instead of making adoptive chosen plaintext queries.
Remarks on GIFT-128-128. In GIFT-128-128, 4 key registers are used to up-
date the state in each round, which makes the number of rounds for independent
computations shorter. Although the number of rounds for full diffusion is longer
than GIFT-64-128, this does not extend the length of IS and PM in a sim-
ple manner. Due to the large number of rounds in GIFT-128-128 compared
to GIFT-64-128, we believe that GIFT-128-128 has sufficient security margin
against the MITM attack.
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4.5 Invariant Subspace Attacks
Since the round constant is XORed only in the MSB of several Sboxes, invariant
subspace attacks [22,29,30] can be a potential threat. The attack utilizes a linear
subspace A and a constant u which is invariant for the round transformation. Its
generalized version utilizes the property that the subspace A⊕ u is mapped to
another subspace A′ ⊕ v after the round transformation. Then if round keys and
constants belong to the subspace A ∩ A′ ⊕ u ⊕ v, the state value always stays
in the subspace A ∩A′ thus the cipher can be distinguished only with a single
query.
We searched for the subspace transition through the GIFT Sbox. There does
not exist any subspace transition with A’s dimension 2 and 3. For dimension 1,
there are five transitions shown in below:
{0, 5} ⊕ a S−→ {0, 5} ⊕ b, k ∈ {0, 5} ⊕ 1,
{0, a} ⊕ 0 S−→ {0, a} ⊕ 1, k ∈ {0, a} ⊕ 1,
{0, c} ⊕ 2 S−→ {0, c} ⊕ 4, k ∈ {0, c} ⊕ 6,
{0, d} ⊕ 5 S−→ {0, d} ⊕ 2, k ∈ {0, d} ⊕ 7,
{0, f} ⊕ 0 S−→ {0, f} ⊕ 1, k ∈ {0, f} ⊕ 1.
In any case, XORing the constant to MSB, i.e. XORing 8 to some nibble, breaks
the invariant subspace, thus GIFT resists the invariant subspace attacks.
4.6 Nonlinear Invariant Attacks
Nonlinear invariant attacks [43] are weak-key attacks that can be applied when
the round constant is XORed only to some particular bits of nibbles. The core
idea is to find a nonlinear approximation of the round transformation with
probability one. For the SPN structure, the attacks are mounted when 1) Sbox
has the quadratic nonlinear invariant and 2) the linear layer is represented by
the multiplication with an orthogonal binary matrix.
The diffusion of GIFT (bit permutation) is orthogonal. However, it is not
represented by the multiplication with an orthogonal binary matrix. Moreover,
we searched for the quadratic nonlinear invariant for GIFT Sbox, but there is no
such invariant. Therefore, GIFT is secure against the nonlinear invariant attacks.
4.7 Algebraic Attacks
We show that algebraic attacks do not threaten GIFT. The Sbox GS has algebraic
degree 3, and from Table 11 we see that for 9-round differential characteristic
of GIFT, there are at least 18 active Sboxes. One can easily check that we have
3 · 18 · b r9c > n, where r is the number of rounds for GIFT-n. Moreover,GS is
described by 21 quadratic equations in the 8 input/output variables over binary
field. The entire system for a fixed-key GIFT permutation therefore consists of
16 · r · 21 quadratic equations in 16 · r · 8 variables. For example, in the case of
GIFT-64, there are 9408 quadratic equations in 3584 variables. In comparison, the
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entire system for a fixed-key AES permutation consists of 6400 equations in 2560
variables. While the applicability of algebraic attacks on AES remains unclear,
those numbers tend to indicate that GIFT offers a high level of protection.
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5 Hardware Implementation
GIFT is surprisingly efficient and on ASIC platforms across various degrees of
serialization. This is mainly due to the extremely lightweight round function that
performs key addition on only half of the state and uses a bit permutation as the
only diffusion mechanism.
5.1 Round based implementation
GIFT includes various design strategies in order to minimize gate count. GIFT
employs key addition to only half of the state and so saves silicon area in the
process. SKINNY uses the same mechanism, but it additionally uses an equal
amount of XOR gates to add the tweak to the state, and so the number of
XOR gates required to construct the roundkey addition layer is equal to that of
any cipher employing full state addition. Additionally, like PRESENT, the GIFT
diffusion layer consists of a bit permutation instead of a lightweight MDS or
AMDS matrix which decreases the area further. However the PRESENT Sbox
occupies around 22.5 GE when synthesized with the standard cell library of the
STM 90nm logic process. The GIFT Sbox occupies only 16.5 GE using the same
library. Although, this is not the most compact choice for Sbox (the 4 bit SKINNY
Sbox occupies only 12 GE), overall the area of GIFT is smaller than both SKINNY
and PRESENT. Furthermore the keyschedule function used in GIFT is also a bit
permutation, and so this module is constructed by a simple wire shuﬄe and takes
no area at all. We can list the following advantages for GIFT when compared to
other block ciphers available in literature:
SKINNY No logic required for diffusion layer, no logic required for keyschedule,
and only half the amount of gates required for roundkey addition.
PRESENT, RECTANGLE No logic required for keyschedule, half the amount of gates
required for roundkey addition, plus GIFT employs a smaller Sbox.
SIMON The SIMON round function also employs roundkey addition of only half
of the state. The SIMON non-linear layer is also smaller than GIFT. However
SIMON has a heavier key-schedule function due to which its total area exceeds
that of GIFT for both the 64 and 128 bit versions.
MIDORI, LED, PICCOLO No logic required for diffusion layer.
In Table 13, we compare the hardware performances of GIFT with other
lightweight ciphers. In Figure 7 we list the individual area requirements of the
respective components in GIFT. We used scan flip-flops to design the storage
elements, which on average saves 1 GE over the combination of a D flip-flop
and 2 to 1 multiplexer. For all the designs in the table, the following design flow
was adhered to. The ciphers were first implemented in VHDL and a functional
simulation was done using the Mentorgraphics Modelsim software. Thereafter the
design was synthesized using the Standard cell library of the STM 90nm CMOS
logic process (CORE90GPHVT v 2.1.a) with the Synopsys Design Compiler,
with the compiler being specifically instructed to optimize the circuit for area.
A timing simulation was done on the synthesized netlist with 1000 test vectors.
The switching activity of each gate of the circuit was collected while running
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post-synthesis simulation. The average power was obtained using Synopsys Power
Compiler, using the back annotated switching activity.
Table 13. Comparison of performance metrics for round based implementations
synthesized with STM 90nm Standard cell library (∗ Piccolo implemented in
dynamic key mode)
Area Delay Cycles TPMAX Power (µW) Energy
(GE) (ns) (MBit/s) (@10MHz) (pJ)
GIFT-64-128 1345 1.83 29 1249.0 74.8 216.9
SKINNY-64-128 1477 1.84 37 966.2 80.3 297.0
PRESENT 64/128 1560 1.63 33 1227.0 71.1 234.6
SIMON 64/128 1458 1.83 45 794.8 72.7 327.3
MIDORI 64 1542 2.06 17 1941.7 60.6 103.0
PICCOLO 64/128∗ 1868 2.32 32 889.9 79.4 254.1
RECTANGLE 64/128 1637 1.61 27 1472.2 76.2 206.0
LED 64/128 1831 5.25 50 243.8 131.3 656.5
GIFT-128-128 1997 1.85 41 1729.7 116.6 478.1
SKINNY-128-128 2104 1.85 41 1729.7 132.5 543.3
SIMON 128/128 2064 1.87 69 1006.6 105.6 728.6
MIDORI 128 2522 2.25 21 2844.4 89.2 187.3
AES 128 7215 3.83 11 3038.2 730.3 803.3
We see that GIFT has the smallest area compared to the other ciphers. From
the pie chart, we see that the storage area (which is a fixed cost) took up most
of the area percentage, the cipher component (which is the variable) only make
up a small percentage to the overall area.
5.2 Serial implementation
The serial implementation of GIFT-64-128 uses a mixed datapath of size 4 bits on
the stateside and 16 bits on the keyside. The architecture has been explained in
Figure 8. GIFT-128-128 uses a similar architecture: a mixture of 4 bit datapath
in the stateside and a 32 bit datapath on the keyside is employed. We also
implemented bit serial versions of GIFT as per the techniques outlined in [26]. In
Table 14, we list the performance comparisons of GIFT with other block ciphers.
While the bit serial implementation of Simon is probably the most compact due
to the nature of the design, but the performance of GIFT is comparable/better
with other ciphers with similar level of serialization.
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GIFT-64-128 (1345 GE) GIFT-128-128 (1997 GE)
Key Register - 649 GE
State Register - 326 GE
S. Layer - 263 GE
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Control System - 43 GE
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Fig. 7. Componentwise area requirements for GIFT-64-128 and GIFT-128-128
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Table 14. Comparison of performance metrics for serial implementations syn-
thesized with STM 90nm Standard cell library (∗ AES implementation figures
from [3])
Degree of Area Delay Cycles TPMAX Power (µW) Energy
Serialization (GE) (ns) (MBit/s) (@10MHz) (nJ)
GIFT-64-128 4/16 1113 2.14 522 57.3 39.0 2.04
GIFT-64-128 1 930 2.67 2816 8.5 35.9 10.11
SKINNY-64-128 4 1265 1.73 756 48.9 59.2 4.48
SKINNY-64-128 1 887 0.98 3152 20.7 42.6 13.42
PRESENT 64/128 4 1158 1.94 576 57.3 58.0 3.34
SIMON 64/128 1 794 1.10 1536 37.9 44.7 6.87
LED 64/128 4 1225 2.54 1904 13.2 49.8 9.48
GIFT-128-128 4/32 1455 2.25 714 79.7 61.7 4.40
GIFT-128-128 1 1213 2.46 6528 8.0 40.3 26.30
SKINNY-128-128 8 1638 1.95 840 78.1 79.1 6.64
SKINNY-128-128 1 1110 0.81 6976 22.7 53.8 37.53
SIMON 128/128 1 1077 1.17 4480 25.1 60.5 27.10
AES 128∗ 8 2060 5.79 246 88.6 129.7 3.19
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6 Software Implementation
In this section, we describe our software implementation of GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.
Due to its inherent bitslice structure, it seems natural to consider that the most
efficient software implementations of GIFT will be bitslice implementations.
Thus, whether you are manipulating 64-bit words, 128-bit XMM words, 256-
bit YMM words or even 512-bit ZMM words, the first task will be to pack the data
into bitslice form. Since the Sbox in both versions of GIFT is a 4-bit Sbox, we will
need to maintain at least four words to be filled with plaintext data. We prefer
to maintain eight such registers, as this will allow us to use the powerful pshufb
instruction to implement the bit permutation. If one word can contain x blocks
of GIFT state, our implementation will then encrypt 8x blocks at each iteration.
For example, implementing GIFT-128 on 256-bit YMM words will require 16
blocks to be ciphered in parallel. We explain here our software implementation
using GIFT-64 on 128-bit XMM words, but the very same strategy (up to a few
details) applies to GIFT-128 and to bigger words as it directly scales.
Packing/Unpacking. We first load the 16 64-bit blocks B0, B1, . . . , B15 into
the eight 128-bit registers R1, R2, . . . , R8:
R1 =b
1
63 b
1
62 . . . b
1
0 ‖ b063 b062 ... b00
R2 =b
3
63 b
3
62 . . . b
3
0 ‖ b263 b262 ... b20
. . .
R8 =b
15
63 b
15
62 . . . b
15
0 ‖ b1463 b1462 ... b140
The packing and unpacking can be done very simply using the SWAPMOVE
process [33]:
SWAPMOVE(A,B,N,M) :
T = ((A  N)⊕B) &M
B = B ⊕ temp
A = A⊕ (T  N)
This process will swap the bits in B masked by M , with the bits in A masked
by (M  N) using only 6 logical operations. Thus, one can pack all the first,
second, third and fourth bits of the Sboxes into R1/R5, R2/R6, R3/R7 and
R4/R8 respectively using:
SWAPMOVE(R1, R2, 0xaaa...aa, 1) SWAPMOVE(R5, R6, 0xaaa...aa, 1)
SWAPMOVE(R3, R4, 0xaaa...aa, 1) SWAPMOVE(R7, R8, 0xaaa...aa, 1)
SWAPMOVE(R1, R3, 0xccc...cc, 2) SWAPMOVE(R5, R7, 0xccc...cc, 2)
SWAPMOVE(R2, R4, 0xccc...cc, 2) SWAPMOVE(R6, R8, 0xccc...cc, 2)
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Then, we can regroup these nibbles into bytes:
SWAPMOVE(R1, R5, 0xf0f...f0, 4) SWAPMOVE(R2, R6, 0xf0f...f0, 4)
SWAPMOVE(R3, R7, 0xf0f...f0, 4) SWAPMOVE(R4, R8, 0xf0f...f0, 4)
At this point, the bits are grouped into packs of bytes as wanted, but bits
of the same plaintext block are spread into different registers, which would slow
down the implementation. We regroup them together using a few unpacking
instructions like punpckhbw and punpcklbw.
Inverting the packing is trivial: one only needs to apply the very same
SWAPMOVE calls, but in a reverse order (the last byte reordering can be
inverted using the packuswb packing instruction).
Round function. Once the data in bitslice mode, computing the round function
is easy. We provide in Appendix C.1 a software-optimized bitslice implementation
of the GIFT Sbox, which requires only 6 XORs, 3 ANDs, 1 OR and 1 NOT
instruction.
Applying the bit permutation is also trivial now that the data is packed into
bytes. Indeed, a crucial property of the GIFT bit permutation is that a bit in slice
i is always sent to the same slice i during this permutation. Thus, applying the
bit permutation layer means simply permuting the ordering of the bytes inside
the registers independently. The entire bit permutation can therefore be applied
with just one pshufb instruction per register.
Subkey addition is performed on all first and second bits of the state. Since
several plaintext blocks are usually ciphered under the same key, it seems a
good strategy to first precompute all the round subkeys, store them and reuse
them when needed with just one memory access. The key schedule can also be
performed very efficiently by simply using a pshufb instruction to complete the
key permutation.
Benchmarks. We have produced this bitslice implementation for AVX2 registers
and we give in Table 15 the benchmarking results on a computer with a Intel
Haswell processor (i5-4460U). We have benchmarked the bitslice implementations
of SIMON and SKINNY (available online) on the same computer for fairness.
Comments. Bitslice implementations can be used for any parallel mode (as it
is the case for most modern operating modes), but can also be used for serial
modes when several users are communicating in parallel. In this setting, the
implementation would be exactly the same, as our key preparation does not
assume that the keys have to be the same for all blocks. In the scenario of a serial
mode for a single user, then a classical table-based or VPERM implementation
will probably be the most efficient option [6].
For low-end micro-controllers, it is very likely that GIFT will perform very
well on this platform. RECTANGLE is very good on micro-controllers and GIFT
shares the same general strategy on this regard. The key schedule being even
simpler, we believe that it will actually perform even better than RECTANGLE.
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Table 15. Bitslice software implementations of GIFT and other lightweight block
ciphers. Performances are given in cycles per byte, with messages composed of
2000 64-bit blocks to obtain the results.
Cipher
Speed
Ref.
(c/B)
GIFT-64-128 2.10 new
SKINNY-64-128 2.88 [28]
SIMON-64-128 1.74 [46]
Cipher
Speed
Ref.
(c/B)
GIFT-128-128 2.57 new
SKINNY-128-128 4.70 [28]
SIMON-128-128 2.55 [46]
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A GIFT in 2-Dimensional Array
This section provides an alternative description of GIFT that resembles the
RECTANGLE description.
A.1 Initialization
The plaintext is arranged into 4 rows of 16/32 bits in a top-down, right to left
manner. The cipher state is described in a two-dimensional array, as illustrated
below. 
bn−4 ... b8 b4 b0
bn−3 ... b9 b5 b1
bn−2 ... b10 b6 b2
bn−1 ... b11 b7 b3
⇒

s0,n4−1 ... s0,2 s0,1 s0,0
s1,n4−1 ... s1,2 s1,1 s1,0
s2,n4−1 ... s2,2 s2,1 s2,0
s3,n4−1 ... s3,2 s3,1 s3,0

The key, on the other hand, is arranged in a right to left, top-down manner.
k31 ... k2 k1 k0
k63 ... k34 k33 k32
k95 ... k66 k65 k64
k127 ... k98 k97 k96
⇒

t0,31 ... t0,2 t0,1 t0,0
t1,31 ... t1,2 t1,1 t1,0
t2,31 ... t2,2 t2,1 t2,0
t3,31 ... t3,2 t3,1 t3,0

A.2 The Round Function
SubCells. Both versions of GIFT use the same invertible 4-bit Sbox, GS. The
Sbox is applied in parallel to every columns of the state.
(s3,j‖s2,j‖s1,j‖s0,j)← GS(s3,j‖s2,j‖s1,j‖s0,j), ∀j ∈ {0, ..., n
4
− 1}.
PermBits. Four different bit permutations are applied to the rows of the cipher
state independently. It maps bits from bit position (i, j) to bit position (i, Pi(j)).
Refer to Table 16 and 17 for each row of the bit permutation for GIFT-64 and
GIFT-128 respectively.
si,Pi(j) ← si,j , ∀i ∈ {0, ..., 3}, ∀j ∈ {0, ...,
n
4
− 1}.
AddRoundKey. A round key of length n/2 is extracted from the key state
and XORed to 2 rows of the cipher state. For GIFT-64, the key state row 0 is
extracted, the first 16 bits are XORed to the cipher state row 0 while the next
16 bits are XORed to the cipher state row 1.
s0,j ← s0,j ⊕ t0,j
s1,j ← s1,j ⊕ t0,j+16, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., 15}.
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Table 16. Specifications of GIFT-64 bit permutation for si,j .
j 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P0(j) 0 12 8 4 1 13 9 5 2 14 10 6 3 15 11 7
P1(j) 4 0 12 8 5 1 13 9 6 2 14 10 7 3 15 11
P2(j) 8 4 0 12 9 5 1 13 10 6 2 14 11 7 3 15
P3(j) 12 8 4 0 13 9 5 1 14 10 6 2 15 11 7 3
Table 17. Specifications of GIFT-128 bit permutation for si,j .
j 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P0(j) 0 24 16 8 1 25 17 9 2 26 18 10 3 27 19 11 4 28 20 12 5 29 21 13 6 30 22 14 7 31 23 15
P1(j) 8 0 24 16 9 1 25 17 10 2 26 18 11 3 27 19 12 4 28 20 13 5 29 21 14 6 30 22 15 7 31 23
P2(j) 16 8 0 24 17 9 1 25 18 10 2 26 19 11 3 27 20 12 4 28 21 13 5 29 22 14 6 30 23 15 7 31
P3(j) 24 16 8 0 25 17 9 1 26 18 10 2 27 19 11 3 28 20 12 4 29 21 13 5 30 22 14 6 31 23 15 7
For GIFT-128, the key state row 0 and 2 are extracted and XORed to the
cipher state row 1 and 2 respectively.
s1,j ← s1,j ⊕ t0,j
s2,j ← s2,j ⊕ t1,j , ∀j ∈ {0, ..., 31}.
In addition to the round key, for both version of GIFT, a single bit “1” is
XORed to the last bit of the cipher state row 3 and a 6-bit round constant
(c5‖c4‖c3‖c2‖c1‖c0) is XORed to first 6 bits of the cipher state row 3.
s3,n4−1 ← s3,n4−1 ⊕ 1,
s3,j ← s3,j ⊕ cj , ∀j ∈ {0, ..., 5}.
A.3 The Key Schedule and Round Constants
The key state update and round constants are the same for both versions of GIFT,
the round key is first extracted from the key state before the key state update.
The key state update first rotates 2 blocks of 16 bits of the key state row 0
independently as follows,
(t0,11‖t0,10‖...‖t0,13‖t0,12) ≫12←−−− (t0,15‖t0,14‖...‖t0,1‖t0,0)
(t0,17‖t0,16‖...‖t0,19‖t0,18) ≫2←−− (t0,31‖t0,30‖...‖t0,17‖t0,16).
Next, the key state rows are rotated upwards to form the final key state.
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The entire key state update is depicted in the following:
t0,31 ... t0,16 t0,15 ... t0,0
t1,31 ... t1,16 t1,15 ... t1,0
t2,31 ... t2,16 t2,15 ... t2,0
t3,31 ... t3,16 t3,15 ... t3,0
←

t1,31 ... t1,16 t1,15 ... t1,0
t2,31 ... t2,16 t2,15 ... t2,0
t3,31 ... t3,16 t3,15 ... t3,0
t0,17 ... t0,18 t0,11 ... t0,12

The round constants are generated using a 6-bit affine LFSR, whose state is
denoted as (c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0). Its update function is defined as:
(c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0)← (c4, c3, c2, c1, c0, c5 ⊕ c4 ⊕ 1).
The six bits are initialized to zero, and updated before being used in a given
round.
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B GIFT in 3-Dimensional Cuboid
This section is not a formal description of GIFT but just an alternative way to
visualise the GIFT structure, especially the bit permutation.
B.1 GIFT-64 Structure
For each nibble, bit 0 is placed in the slice 0, bit 1 in slice 1, bit 2 in slice 2 and
bit 3 in slice 3. As shown in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Position of the bits. Slice 0,1,2,3 are in red, yellow, green, blue respectively.
These slices can be placed together to form a cuboid. As shown in Figure 10.
Fig. 10. Cubic representation of the main state of GIFT-64. The black cuboid is
where an Sbox is implemented.
Subcells. 16 Sboxes are implemented in parallel in the bitslice manner, as seen
in Figure 10.
PermBits. The bit permutation can be implemented as follows:
1. Take the transpose of each individual slice (see Figure 11).
2. Apply row swap to each slice,
• Slice 0: swap row 1 with 3
• Slice 1: swap row 0 with 1, and swap row 2 with 3
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• Slice 2: swap row 0 with 2
• Slice 3: swap row 0 with 3, and swap row 1 with 2
Fig. 11. The slices after transpose. The black boxes are the rows that will be
swapped.
The final bit positions after the PermBits can be seen in Figure 12.
Fig. 12. The final bit positions after PermBits.
B.2 GIFT-128 Structure
Two slices are needed to pack bit i from each nibble, forming 2 cuboids as seen
in Figure 13. Slice 0 and 4 contains all the bit 0, slice 1 and 5 contains all the bit
1, slice 2 and 6 contains all the bit 2, and slice 3 and 7 contains all the bit 3.
SubCells. 32 Sboxes are implemented in parallel in the bitslice manner.
PermBits. The bit permutation can be implemented as follows:
1. Take the transpose of each individual slice (see Figure 14).
2. Shuﬄe each pair of slices containing same the bit i (see Figure 15).
3. Apply swap between each pair of slices (see Figure 16),
• Slice 0 and 4: swap the 2 bottom halves
• Slice 1 and 5: swap the top and bottom halves of the slices independently
• Slice 2 and 6: swap the 2 top halves
• Slice 3 and 7: cross swap the top and bottom halves
The final bit positions after the PermBits can be seen in Figure 17.
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Fig. 13. Cubic representation of the main state of GIFT-128. The black cuboid
is where an Sbox is implemented.
Fig. 14. Slice 0 and 4 after transpose.
Fig. 15. Shuﬄing Slice 0 and 4.
B.3 Key State Structure
The key state structure is different from the cipher state structure, the first 16
bits are loaded into key slice 0, next 16 bits are loaded into key slice 1 and so on
for all the 8 slices. The key slices are placed together to form a cuboid as seen in
Figure 18.
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Fig. 16. Swapping the slices.
Fig. 17. Final slice arrangement.
For GIFT-64, key slice 0 is XORed to state slice 0 and key slice is XORed to
state slice 1 in a bitwise manner. For GIFT-128, key slice 0 and 1 are XORed to
state slice 1 and 5, while key slice 4 and 5 are XORed to state slice 2 and 6.
The key state is then updated as follows:
1. Slice 0: shift 12 bits towards LSB
2. Slice 1: shift 2 bits towards LSB
3. Move slice 0 and 1 to the back of slice 7
Figure 19 shows the bit positions of key slice 0 and 1 after the bit rotations,
the other 6 slices remain unchanged.
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Fig. 18. Cubic representation of the key slices.
Fig. 19. Key slice 0 and 1 after rotation.
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C Details of GIFT Sbox
C.1 GIFT Sbox Implementation
1 /* Input: (MSB) x[3], x[2], x[1], x[0] (LSB) */
2 x[1] = x[1] XNOR (x[0] NAND x[2]);
3 x[0] = x[0] XNOR (x[1] NAND x[3]);
4 x[2] = x[2] XNOR (x[0] NOR x[1]);
5 x[3] = x[3] XNOR x[2];
6 x[1] = x[1] XNOR x[3];
7 x[2] = x[2] XNOR (x[0] NAND x[1]);
8 /* Output: (MSB) x[0], x[2], x[1], x[3] (LSB) */
Fig. 20. Area-optimized hardware implementation of the GIFT Sbox.
1 /* Input: (MSB) x[3], x[2], x[1], x[0] (LSB) */
2 x[1] = x[1] XOR (x[0] AND x[2]);
3 t = x[0] XOR (x[1] AND x[3]);
4 x[2] = x[2] XOR (t OR x[1]);
5 x[0] = x[3] XOR x[2];
6 x[1] = x[1] XOR x[0];
7 x[0] = NOT x[0];
8 x[2] = x[2] XOR (t AND x[1]);
9 x[3] = t;
10 /* Output: (MSB) x[3], x[2], x[1], x[0] (LSB) */
Fig. 21. Software-optimized implementation of the GIFT Sbox.
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C.2 GIFT Sbox DDT and LAT
Table 18. Differential Distribution Table (DDT) of GIFT Sbox.
∆O
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
4 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
5 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 4
6 0 0 4 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
∆I 7 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 4 2 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
9 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0
a 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0
b 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0
c 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
d 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2
e 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0
f 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2
Table 19. Linear approximation table (LAT) of GIFT Sbox. Each entry represents
]{x ∈ F42|x • α = S(x) • β} − 8.
β
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 2 -2 -2 2 4 0 0 -4 -2 -2 -2 -2
2 0 0 0 -4 0 4 0 0 2 2 2 -2 2 -2 2 2
3 0 0 0 -4 -2 -2 2 -2 2 -2 -2 -2 0 4 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 -4
5 0 0 0 0 2 -2 2 -2 0 4 4 0 2 2 -2 -2
6 0 0 0 -4 4 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 2 2 -2 -2 -2
α 7 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 -2 2 -2 -2 -2 4 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 -4 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 4
9 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 2 2 4 0 0 4 2 -2 2 -2
a 0 0 -4 0 0 0 4 0 -2 -2 2 -2 -2 -2 2 -2
b 0 0 4 0 2 -2 2 2 -2 2 -2 -2 0 0 4 0
c 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 4 0 0 0 0 0
d 0 -4 4 0 -2 2 2 -2 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2
e 0 -4 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 -2 2 2 -2 2 2 2
f 0 -4 0 0 -2 -2 -2 2 -2 -2 2 -2 4 0 0 0
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